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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, EXPRESSIVE
ASSOCIATION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
JOSHUA S. SELLERS*
Increasingly novel legal conflicts over electoral participation and voting
rights are on the rise. For instance, multiple aspects of Georgia’s election system
have been challenged, including the state’s “exact match” policy. An Arizona
law imposing harsh penalties on initiative petition circulators who fail to
respond to subpoenas is the subject of an ongoing lawsuit. And a Tennessee
law that strictly regulated voter registration drives was recently enjoined and
ultimately repealed. As states implement unprecedented methods of election
administration, courts, in turn, are tasked with determining just what the
“right to vote” entails and to what extent it encompasses efforts by
organizations to engage voters in the political process. This Essay explores this
dynamic and considers how more intensive methods of election administration
may, paradoxically, result in a broader conception of the right to vote that the
First Amendment expressly protects.
Part I of this Essay summarizes the unresolved—and potentially dispositive—
doctrinal debate over the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to state
laws implicating both voting and expressive association. Part II examines the
doctrinal irresolution in the context of two recent cases, Miracle v. Hobbs in
Arizona and League of Women Voters v. Hargett in Tennessee. Viewed
together, these cases illustrate the contingent nature of organizations’ ability to
engage voters; an ambiguity of great consequence as we approach Election 2020.
Part III outlines the short and long-term political significance of whether a capacious
or circumscribed conception of the right to vote in this context prevails.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ....................................................................................... 1618
I. Judicial Review of Electoral Regulations ................................ 1621
II. Competing Conceptions of the Right to Vote: Examples
from Arizona and Tennessee .................................................. 1625
A. Miracle v. Hobbs .................................................................. 1625
B. League of Women Voters of Tennessee v. Hargett .................... 1627
III. The Short- and Long-Term Political Stakes ........................ 1629
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 1632

* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor College
of Law. Thank you to my junior colleagues for their feedback and to the editorial staff
of the American University Law Review for their stellar work on this Essay.

1617

1618

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1617

INTRODUCTION
A voter who believes her right to vote has been unjustifiably denied
or abridged can invoke several viable legal claims.1 Likewise,
organizations that facilitate others’ right to vote may raise similar
claims when their efforts are impeded.2 Such legal disputes are
typically unremarkable. However, increasingly novel legal conflicts
over electoral participation and voting rights are on the rise. As states
implement unprecedented methods of election administration, courts,
in turn, are tasked with determining just what the “right to vote” entails,3
and to what extent it encompasses efforts by organizations to engage
voters in the political process. This Essay explores this dynamic and
considers how more intensive methods of election administration may,
paradoxically, result in a broader conception of the right to vote that
the First Amendment expressly protects.
Traditionally conceived, the right to vote is the right of any U.S.
citizen to show up at a polling place on a legislatively determined
Election Day and cast a ballot.4 That basic conception, of course, vastly
oversimplifies matters. For one, simply showing up is not always easy,
particularly in jurisdictions where polling sites are few and far between.5
Even assuming access, one’s experience at a polling site will depend on
the type of ballot and voting machine used.6 Furthermore, even the idea
of a single election day is oversimplified: many voters can cast their
ballot in person prior to Election Day or participate by mail.7 In some

1. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C.
§ 10301 (2012).
2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
3. See Derek T. Muller, The Democracy Ratchet, 94 IND. L.J. 451, 460 (2019)
(“Aggressive litigant skepticism of new election laws has, in turn, put courts in a
skeptical posture of new election laws.”).
4. Federal statutes establish Election Day for the House of Representatives and
the Senate as the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of even calendar
years and for the President and Vice President as the first Tuesday after the First Monday
in November every fourth year. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7; 3 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7. States and local
governments, for the most part, remain free to hold their elections when they desire.
5. See LEADERSHIP CONF. ED. FUND, DEMOCRACY DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE
CLOSURES AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 8 (Sept. 2019), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/
reports/Democracy-Diverted.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SS5-D2HY] (“Closing polling
places has a cascading effect, leading to long lines at other polling places,
transportation hurdles, denial of language assistance and other forms of in-person
help, and mass confusion about where eligible voters may cast their ballot.”). Also, it
is often difficult to travel to government agencies that register voters and issue
qualifying forms of voter identification. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 47, Spirit Lake Tribe v. Jaeger, No. 1:18-cv-00222
(D.N.D. Feb. 28, 2019) (“Travel to a driver’s license site to obtain a qualifying North
Dakota ID imposes a severe burden on Native American voters. Only 19 [driver’s
license (DL)] sites exist across the state, and there is not a single DL site on an
Indian reservation in the state. The DL sites closest to North Dakota Indian
reservations have limited hours and require eligible voters to drive . . . substantial
distances in order to obtain qualifying ID.”).
6. Ballots and voting machines vary greatly both in their design and in their
ease of use, a point driven home by, among other notable examples, Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“This case has shown that punchcard balloting machines can
produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not punched in a clean,
complete way by the voter.”), and Maine’s recent adoption of ranked-choice voting
for both congressional and presidential elections. See Maggie Astor, Maine Voters Will
Rank Their Top Presidential Candidates in 2020, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/us/politics/maine-elections.html.
7. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, 4 TIPS FOR MANAGING ALTERNATIVE VOTING
METHODS 1 (Oct. 2014), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/EAC
_4TipsForVotingMethods_508_HiRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YP5-KPGW] (“Nationwide
voting has slowly moved from one Election Day toward an election period of several days
or weeks that can involve a variety of methods for voting.”).
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locations, even smartphone voting is underway.8 In short, the right to
vote encompasses a range of activities far exceeding the mere
completion of a paper ballot in a private booth.
In addition to encompassing the activities of individuals, the right to
vote also encompasses organizational activities. For instance, laws that
impede the ability of political parties to encourage voter participation
implicate both the First Amendment right of association afforded to
parties and individuals’ right to vote.9 Nonpolitical party
organizations that facilitate others’ right to vote—e.g., The League of
Women Voters and Rock the Vote—enjoy similar legal standing when
their efforts are hampered. Viewed from a distance, then, a “voting
ecosystem”10 begins to take shape: the law entitles individuals to vote
on generally equal terms with others, subject to reasonable methods
of state election administration, and protects the endeavors of
organizations that aid in that process.11
These basic tenets are uncontroversial as far as they go, yet on their
own, fail to resolve actual legal challenges. In recent years, states have
enacted, with both legitimate and pretextual justifications, laws that
make it harder to vote.12 Some of these laws target voters, others
target organizations.13 Many involve the imposition of onerous
bureaucratic processes that individuals or organizations must
navigate in order to comply with the law and, in some instances, avoid
the prospect of criminal charges.14 In response, litigants have
advanced creative legal theories with the hope of expanding the
definitional parameters of the right to vote.15 This Essay explores
whether existing voting rights doctrine can facilitate such an expansion,
such that organizational rights are robustly protected.
Resolution of the organizational question requires resolution of a
normative framing question: do we wish to adopt a broad conception of
our voting system, one that apprehends the interrelationship between
8. See, e.g., John Dahlia, History-Making, Mobile Voting App for Overseas Military Now
in 24 Counties, WVNEWS.COM (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.wvnews.com/ews/
wvnews/history-making-mobile-voting-app-for-overseas-military-now-in/article_
0402b7dd-af11-56ed-a42d-5981a214f9c0.html [https://perma.cc/37G9-JBZQ]; Miles
Parks, Exclusive: Seattle-Area Voters To Vote By Smartphone In 1st For U.S. Elections, NPR
(Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798126153/exclusive-seattle-areavoters-to-vote-by-smartphone-in-1st-for-u-s-elections [https://perma.cc/8VN3-CSZE].
9. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (“In the present situation
the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights—the
right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both
of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms.”).
10. The idea of a voting or election “ecosystem” is taken from STEVEN F. HUEFNER
ET AL., FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTION
ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 2 (2011) (“[W]e view the elections systems of
all five states as ecosystems in which it is dangerous to tinker with one element
without considering how it might affect the others.”).
11. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1155,
1159 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (“Together speech and voting are constitutional rights of
special significance; they are the rights most protective of all others, joined in this
respect by the ability to vindicate one’s rights in a federal court.”); see also Daniel P.
Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 763 (2016) (“What is the
relationship between the First Amendment right to expressive association and the
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote? It’s closer than you probably think.”).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See Lisa Marshall Manheim & Elizabeth G. Porter, The Elephant in the Room:
Intentional Voter Suppression 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 217 (2018) (“[N]ow that litigants
no longer need to frame their arguments with one eye on Justice Kennedy, there may
be more space for the maturation of legal theories to prevent voter suppression, even
if those theories do not bear immediate fruit.”).
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various elements of the electoral system? Consider, for example, the 2018
election cycle in Georgia, a high-profile election in which nearly fourmillion votes were cast, a state record.16 Much of the enthusiasm was
driven by a closely watched gubernatorial election between Secretary of
State Brian Kemp and his Democratic opponent, former minority leader of
the Georgia House of Representatives, Stacey Abrams.17 Abrams was seeking
to make history as the nation’s first African-American female governor.18
While Secretary Kemp eventually triumphed, Abrams initially
refused to concede, openly incriminating an election system riddled
with flaws, many of which she accused Secretary Kemp of
exacerbating. 19 She carried that message forward, forming an
organization—Fair Fight Action—that is leading the legal fight
against multiple aspects of Georgia’s election system on behalf of
voters.20 The organization’s principal lawsuit charged Georgia
election officials with unconstitutionally purging eligible voters;
implementing an “exact match” policy, which requires a showing of
identical personal information on various government records;21
unlawfully closing polling places; unlawfully denying voters access to
provisional ballots; unlawfully distributing and managing absentee
ballots; and maintaining an election system vulnerable to hacking.22
The lawsuit claimed that these “problems in Georgia’s voting system
are pervasive, severe, chronic, and persistent.”23
At its core, the lawsuit seeks judicial acknowledgment of a
comprehensive conception of the right to vote. Its claims presume
that the law entitles voters to an electoral system that is relatively easy

16. Maya T. Prabhu, Midterm Voter Turnout Surges in Georgia, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov.
7, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/midterm-voter-turnoutsurges-georgia/P51TgGVyRJxwcKufdXKncM [https://perma.cc/6ARZ-VTAR].
17. See Richard Faussett, How Voting Became a Central Issue in the Georgia Governor’s Race,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/ politics/georgiagovernor-voting-irregularities.html.
18. Id.
19. Alan Blinder & Richard Fausset, Stacey Abrams Ends Fight for Georgia Governor
with Harsh Words for Her Rival, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/11/16/us/elections/georgia-governor-race-kemp-abrams.html
(“Although she pledged to pray for Mr. Kemp, she also uncorked a bracing
indictment of his tenure as secretary of state, including the election last week. She
excoriated a system, overseen by Mr. Kemp and legions of local officials, that left
voters lawfully purged from the rolls, waiting in the rain and facing rejections of their
ballots for arbitrary reasons.”).
20. See Jelani Cobb, Stacey Abrams’s Fight for a Fair Vote, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/19/stacey-abrams-fight-fora-fair-vote [https://perma.cc/H8QL-FNUV]. The litigation is entitled Ebenezer Baptist
Church of Atlanta v. Raffensperger. Fair Fight Action, Inc. was the lead plaintiff but has
since dropped out of the litigation.
21. Many of the policy’s most controversial provisions have since been
eliminated. See Press Release, Stanley Augustin, Georgia Largely Abandons Its Broken
“Exact Match” Voter Registration Process (Apr. 5, 2019), https://lawyerscommittee
.org/georgia-largely-abandons-its-broken-exact-match-voter-registration-process
[https://perma.cc/64GG-CNA9].
22. Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 19–22, Fair Fight
Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger, No. 1:18-cv-05391 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2019).
23. Id. at 22. Some changes to the state’s election system have been made. See
Cobb, supra note 20 (reporting that, in addition to installing new voting machines,
Governor Kemp signed bills which extended the “use it or lose it” period to five
calendar years and ensured protections for voters who use absentee or provisional
ballots, and Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger has opened up an
investigation into the 4700 absentee ballot applications that went missing in 2018). On
December 27, 2019, the district court judge hearing the case denied plaintiffs’ request for
a preliminary injunction, which sought the reinstatement of approximately 100,000 voters
who had been removed from the voter rolls. Elisha Brown, Federal Judge Backs Georgia’s
Purge of Nearly 100,000 Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/12/27/us/elections/georgia-voters-purge.html.
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to navigate insofar as it does not require voters to travel long distances
or wait in long lines, does not intentionally or unintentionally
disadvantage minority voters, does not raise administrative burdens
that are likely to discourage participation, does not discount or discard
provisional and absentee ballots, and which is safe from outside
interference or tampering. Anything less, it is argued, presents
constitutional and/or statutory concerns.24 Such a comprehensive
conception is a prerequisite to the robust protection of organizations’
political rights. Put differently, the voting process is multifaceted and
implicates myriad actors and institutions, not simply individual voters.
Organizations, whether through voter registration or civic education
initiatives, play an essential role in our electoral system.
In sum, the enormous stakes of Election 2020 have heightened the
election-related concerns of voters, voting-rights advocates, and
elected officials. Georgia is only one of many battlegrounds. The
misgivings articulated by Fair Fight Action’s suit are shared by
individuals and organizations across the nation, resulting in a
proliferation of lawsuits.25 This Essay evaluates two such lawsuits
involving organizations that facilitate political participation and the
question of whether litigation of this type may, in fact, result in a
more capacious understanding of the boundaries of the right to vote.
Part I of this Essay summarizes the unresolved—and potentially
dispositive—doctrinal debate over the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny to be applied to state laws implicating both voting and
expressive association. Part II examines the doctrinal irresolution in
the context of two recent cases, Miracle v. Hobbs in Arizona and League
of Women Voters v. Hargett in Tennessee. Viewed together, these cases
illustrate the contingent nature of organizations’ ability to engage
voters; an ambiguity of great consequence as we approach Election
2020. Part III outlines the short and long-term political significance
of whether a capacious or circumscribed conception of the right to
vote in this context prevails.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ELECTORAL REGULATIONS
Election laws (along with federal and state constitutional provisions)
implicating the right to vote come in seemingly countless forms. Such
laws dictate everything from who is eligible to participate to the order
in which candidates are placed on a ballot. Election Day is of course
also highly regulated, with, for instance, the precise method of voting
varying from county to county and limits placed on polling place
activity.26 Additional laws inform how votes are tallied and how postelection disputes are resolved.27 On one level, this makes sense. The

24. Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 22, at 1, 85–86.
25. See, e.g., Robert Yablon, Voting, Spending, and the Right to Participate, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 655, 657 (2017) (“On the voting front, frenetic legislative and regulatory activity,
primarily at the state level, has generated substantial litigation but little doctrinal clarity.”);
Press Release, Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Memo: Democratic
Campaign Committees Investing Millions to Protect Voting Rights Across Battleground
States (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.dscc.org/press-release/memo-democratic-campaigncommittees-investing-millions-to-protect-voting-rights-across-battleground-states
[https://perma.cc/US46-L6GM].
26. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (“[W]e hold that requiring
solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not constitute
an unconstitutional compromise.”).
27. See, e.g., Jonathan Lai, Pennsylvania’s Presidential Election Could Be Too Close to
Call for Days Because of a New Law, PHILA. INQUIRER (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.
inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-2020-presidential-election-resultsabsentee-ballots-20200117.html [https://perma.cc/VZJ3-YQCS] (“[A] new law
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right to vote is fundamental—in both the colloquial and constitutional
senses28—and is the cornerstone of our democracy; the voting process
should therefore be highly regulated. That said, its designation as a
fundamental right ostensibly elevates the burden on government to
sustain such regulations.
Complicating matters further is the First Amendment right of
association and its appositeness in the voting context. As Daniel
Tokaji has detailed, the Supreme Court has long perceived the rights
to vote and to expressive association as closely tethered,
complementary rights.29 The connection was drawn in Williams v.
Rhodes,30 a case involving a challenge to several Ohio election laws
brought by two third parties: the Ohio American Independent Party,
a vehicle for the 1968 presidential candidacy of George Wallace, and
the Socialist Labor Party.31
Before Williams, Ohio law required new political parties seeking
placement on the state’s presidential ballot to present signed
petitions by qualified electors totaling at least fifteen percent of the
ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election.32 In addition,
new parties were required to file their nominating petitions in
February, well before the two major parties.33 The Supreme Court
concluded that Ohio “has made it virtually impossible for a new
political party, even though it has hundreds of thousands of
members, or an old party, which has a very small number of
members, to be placed on the state ballot.”34 The Court expressly
invoked the connection between the right to vote and the First
Amendment right of expressive association, stating, “[n]o extended
discussion is required to establish that the Ohio laws before us give
the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new
parties struggling for existence and thus place substantially unequal
burdens on both the right to vote and the right to associate.”35
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court invalidated the laws.36
The Court’s application of strict scrutiny to voting-related
restrictions comported with prior caselaw37 and, for a short time,

means a significant share of ballots might not be tallied until after Election Day,
according to county elections officials.”).
28. The Supreme Court has designated the right to vote as a “fundamental
right.” Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–67 (1966). But see Joshua A.
Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 157
(2008) (noting that “the Court sometimes considers the right to vote as fundamental
and sometimes conspicuously omits any fundamental rights language”).
29. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 771 (“The Supreme Court has long flirted with the
idea that voting is a form of speech protected by the First Amendment but has never
adopted this position. It has, however, held that voting is a form of expressive
association protected by the First Amendment.”); see also Yablon, supra note 25, at 679
(making the related point that “[t]hese open-ended constitutional guarantees of
equality and of expressive and associational liberty are not so rigidly deterministic”).
30. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
31. Id. at 26. On the presidential candidacies and legacy of George Wallace, see Frank
Rich, After Trump, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://nymag.com/inteligencer/
2017/11/frank-rich-trumpism-after-trump.html [https://perma.cc/46UA-2WCN].
32. Id. at 24–25.
33. Id. at 36 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 24.
35. Id. at 31.
36. Id. (“The State has here failed to show any ‘compelling interest’ which
justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote and to associate.”).
37. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[S]ince the right to
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic
civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
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seemed to be the settled approach.38 Gradually, however, the Court
began to intimate that heightened review was not always appropriate.
In Storer v. Brown,39 the Court heard a challenge to California’s “sore
loser” law40 that prohibited candidates who had lost a primary
election from running as an independent in the general election.
The Court upheld the law, noting “as a practical matter, there must
be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic processes.”41 Accordingly, the initial task is now to
assess whether the law at issue is, in fact, invidious—an inquiry that,
by extension, determines the appropriate standard of review.42
Storer presaged the Court’s introduction of an election-law-specific
form of judicial review now commonly referred to as “AndersonBurdick,” a shorthand for the two cases from which it derives: Anderson
v. Celebrezze43 and Burdick v. Takushi.44 The challenge in Anderson was
to an Ohio law requiring independent presidential candidates—the
plaintiff was independent presidential candidate John Anderson45—
to submit petition signatures no later than March of the election year,
despite the fact that the two major parties would not select their
nominees for several more months.46
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the majority cited Williams v. Rhodes to
establish the link between the right to vote and the right of expressive
association.47 He then, though, asserted “[a]lthough these rights of
voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the States on
candidates’ eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect
burdens on voters’ rights to associate or to choose among
candidates.”48 Thus, as foreshadowed in Storer, Justice Stevens
instructed courts to first determine the severity of the alleged injury.
The central passage details the process:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of
the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It
then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In
passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must
consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is
the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged
provision is unconstitutional.49

38. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969)
(“[I]n this case, we must give the statute a close and exacting examination.”); see also
Douglas, supra note 28, at 151 (“At one time, the Court always construed the right to
vote in the context of voter eligibility as a fundamental right, but now the
jurisprudence is not as clear.”).
39. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
40. On sore loser laws, see generally Michael S. Kang, Sore Loser Laws and
Democratic Contestation, 99 GEO. L.J. 1013 (2011).
41. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
42. Id.
43. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
44. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
45. Scott Neuman, John Anderson, Independent for President in 1980, Dies at 95, NPR
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/05/568489924/
john-anderson-independent-for-president-in-1980-dies-at-95
[https://perma.cc/WHQ2-GXFP].
46. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 790–91.
47. Id. at 786–87.
48. Id. at 788.
49. Id. at 789.
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The majority found the Ohio law failed this test, notably, in part
because of the prospect of dampened enthusiasm and participation
among independent candidates and their supporters (voters,
volunteers, and donors).50 Outcome aside, Anderson introduced a less
rigorous form of judicial review in the election regulations context.51
Burdick, which upheld a Hawaii ban on write-in votes, offered a slight
modification to this approach, clarifying that laws that impose a “severe”
burden on the right to vote remain subject to strict scrutiny.52 By
contrast, when laws impose only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions,”53 then “the State’s important regulatory interests are
generally sufficient to justify” the law.54 As the Anderson-Burdick doctrine
evolved, election law claims grounded in the First Amendment became far
less common.55 However, adjacent doctrines directly pertaining to
political speech reinforced the substantial constitutional protection
afforded expressive association in the political context.
The Court has long held that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom
to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is
an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.”56 In addition, “the freedom to join together in furtherance
of common political beliefs ‘necessarily presupposes the freedom to
identify the people who constitute the association.’”57 Such freedom
extends not only to individuals but to organizations as well.58 The
50. Id. at 792 (highlighting that in addition to barring potential candidates who
decided to run after March from running at all, and overly restraining candidates
that did decide to run by the deadline, the Ohio law would hinder an independent
campaign’s efforts to recruit volunteers, raise funds, and secure publicity).
51. Josh Douglas notes that “Anderson confirmed that the Court no longer
approached an election law case from a fundamental rights framework.” Douglas,
supra note 28, at 159. Armand Derfner and J. Gerald Hebert lament the decision’s
introduction of what they call a “lenient balancing test.” Armand Derfner & J. Gerald
Hebert, Voting Is Speech, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 481 (2016). But cf. Samuel
Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law, 92 IND. L.J.
299, 307 (2016) (critiquing the decision for “craft[ing] a test that brought election
regulation perilously close to the generally crushing least-restrictive-means analysis
from First Amendment law”).
52. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502
U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
53. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
54. Id.; see Tokaji, supra note 11, at 777 (“Burdick’s main doctrinal contribution is
to clarify that only a restriction that is ‘severe’ should receive strict scrutiny, requiring
government to show it is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.”); Derfner &
Hebert, supra note 51, at 483 (“While the Anderson ‘balancing test’ was vague and left
significant room for restrictions on voting, depending on its interpretation, Burdick
further increased the task of those challenging voting restrictions and lowered the
practical level of review to something akin to rational basis review.”); see also Yablon,
supra note 25, at 661 (“On the voting side, the Court has downplayed the burdens
that regulations impose, cast the government’s regulatory interests in broad terms,
and placed the onus squarely on plaintiffs to establish that a regulation’s burdens
outweigh its benefits.”). After applying its new test to Hawaii’s law, the Court
determined that the state’s interests in preventing contentious elections and in
discouraging “party raiding” during primaries sufficiently outweighed the burden
that the ban on write-in voting has on voters. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439–40.
55. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 784.
56. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
57. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 214–15 (1986) (quoting
Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)).
58. Political parties receive considerable protection under the First Amendment.
See e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222
(1989) (“If the challenged law burdens the rights of political parties and their
members, it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows that it advances a
compelling state interest . . . .”). Nonpartisan organizations engaged in political activity
are similarly protected. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (“Where groups, formal or informal, seek to advance their goals through the
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precise relationship, however, between these core First Amendment
doctrines and states’ essential need to regulate the electoral process
remains a source of confusion.
In select contexts, the Court has distinguished laws that regulate
“the mechanics of the electoral process”59 from those that regulate
“pure speech,”60 subjecting the latter to “exacting scrutiny”61 rather
than the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. Yet to date, this distinction
has been inadequately developed in the lower courts. In sum, the
appropriate form of judicial review of organizations’ involvement in
the political process is distinctly unsettled.62
II. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE: EXAMPLES
FROM ARIZONA AND TENNESSEE
As Part I made clear, uncertainty remains over the appropriate degree
of judicial scrutiny to be applied to state laws implicating both voting
and expressive association. This Part examines the doctrinal irresolution
in the context of two recent cases: Miracle v. Hobbs63 (Arizona) and
League of Women Voters of Tennessee v. Hargett64 (Tennessee).
A. Miracle v. Hobbs
In 2014, the Arizona legislature enacted a law commonly referred to
as the “Strikeout Law.”65 The law requires the Arizona Secretary of State
to strike all signatures gathered by a “registered” initiative petition
circulator66 if the circulator fails to appear in response to a subpoena.67 A
subpoena may be sought by any person “in the superior court of the
county in which the circulator is registered.”68 Supporters of the law,
including state officials, defend the law as a method of preventing fraud
and preserving the integrity of the ballot initiative process.69 The law
threatens to have a significant impact on the initiative process in
Arizona, a state in which direct democracy is commonplace.70
In July 2019, a group of both petition circulators (who are also
registered voters) and, importantly here, organizations involved in

electoral process, regulations preventing their members from becoming [election]
registrars impair their ability effectively to organize and make their voices heard.”).
59. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
62. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 316–17 (2007).
63. Complaint at 1, Miracle v. Hobbs, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. July 11, 2019).
64. Complaint at 1, League of Women Voters of Tenn. v. Hargett, No. 3:19-cv00385 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2019).
65. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-118(E) (2019); see Howard Fischer, Judge Lets
Arizona Law on Initiative Petitions to Stand, ARIZ. CAP. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019),
https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2019/12/16/judge-lets-arizona-law-on-initiativepetitions-to-stand [https://perma.cc/Z8JH-EYUB] (noting that the law has “been
dubbed the Strikeout Law”).
66. Only paid and nonresident petition circulators are required to register. § 19-118(A).
67. § 19-118(E) (“If a registered circulator is properly served with a subpoena to
provide evidence in an action regarding circulation of petitions and fails to appear or
produce documents as provided for in the subpoena, all signatures collected by that
circulator are deemed invalid.”).
68. § 19-118(F).
69. Howard Fischer, State Wants Challenge to Petition Law Thrown out of Court,
https://tucson.com/news/local/state-wants-challenge-to-petition-law-thrown-out-of-court/
article_047e2c88-6508-52b7-ab96-cf9256b77a05.html [https://perma.cc/FV8A-DLK4].
70. The law was previously upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court when
challenged under state law. Stanwitz v. Reagan, 429 P.3d 1138, 1145 (Ariz. 2018). On
direct democracy in Arizona, see Daniel A. Smith & Caroline Tolbert, The Instrumental and
Educative Effects of Ballot Measures: Research on Direct Democracy in the American States, 7 ST.
POL. & POL’Y Q. 416, 420 (2007) (providing data on statewide initiatives in Arizona).
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the initiative process, challenged the law under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, arguing that it “denies core constitutional
rights of political speech and association, along with the right to vote or
participate meaningfully in the initiative process.”71 More specifically,
they claimed that “the “indiscriminate rejection of voter signatures”72
based solely on a petition circulator’s failure to respond to a potentially
dubious subpoena request “effectively silences hundreds of thousands of
Arizona citizens who sponsor, circulate, or sign petitions, as well as those
who associate with them to promote or fund initiatives in Arizona.”73
The law, plaintiffs attested, thus chills speech by making it harder for
initiative proponents to hire and retain petition circulators, thereby
impermissibly decreasing the likelihood that initiative proponents will
find success.74 The law also, plaintiffs argued, imposes an undue
burden on the fundamental right to vote.75
The Arizona Secretary of State defended the law by arguing that,
because it does not directly regulate circulation or advocacy, it “does
not implicate the First Amendment at all.”76 As framed, “[t]he crucial
question for courts considering challenges to initiative-related
regulations is thus whether the regulation directly bans anyone from
circulating, or whether it merely regulates the circulation process.”77
Defendant further argued, with regard to plaintiffs’ claim that the law
would diminish the pool of circulators, that “all regulations of
petition circulation potentially reduce the pool of available
circulators”78 and that the law imposes only a “lesser,” fully justified
burden.79 Moreover, “[t]he fact that a regulation makes it less likely
that initiatives will be enacted is . . . not constitutionally
determinative.”80 Finally, regarding the claim that the law imposes an
undue burden on the fundamental right to vote, defendant argued
that signature invalidations “have nothing to do with the petition
signers and everything to do with whether those who circulate the
petitions comply with the applicable rules.”81
The parties are equally at odds over the appropriate level of
judicial review in cases of this type, betraying a fundamental
disagreement that, as noted above, persists among reviewing courts.
Plaintiffs argued, first, that because the Strikeout Law restricts “core
political speech” by chilling speech and reducing plaintiffs’
likelihood of success, strict scrutiny should be applied.82 Alternatively,
because initiatives implicate the fundamental right to vote, they
should be evaluated under Anderson-Burdick, under which, recall, a
severe burden on voters also triggers strict scrutiny.83 By contrast, as
71. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Miracle v. Hobbs, No.
2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. July 11, 2019), ECF No. 1.
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id.
74. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support
at 9–10, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (July 18, 2019), ECF No. 9.
75. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 71, at 33.
76. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Motion to Dismiss at 8, Miracle, No.
2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2019), ECF No. 16.
77. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss
at 1, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (Sept. 13, 2019), ECF No. 25.
78. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 76, at 11.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Reply in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 77, at 8.
82. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support,
supra note 74, at 7–10.
83. Id. at 15 (“Because their right to meaningfully participate in the initiative
process hinges solely on a factor outside their knowledge or control that is
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noted above, defendant argued that neither the First Amendment
nor the fundamental right to vote is implicated at all, and,
consequently, the defendant could easily satisfy the applicable
Anderson-Burdick balancing test.84
In ruling on plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss, the district court judge
agreed with the defendant that the relevant precedents draw a
distinction between “laws that regulate the communicative conduct of
persons advocating a particular message and laws that regulate the
procedures by which legislation is enacted.”85 The judge therefore
determined, based on that distinction, that because the Strikeout Law
does not implicate “the communicative message associated with the
physical act of circulation at the time of circulation,” any resulting
injuries are only incidental to plaintiffs’ expressive association
rights.86 The law is focused not on speech or association, but on
“subpoena-related compliance that comes into play only after all
initiative-related speech has occurred.”87 Accordingly, the judge
concluded, judicial review asks only whether the burden on political
speech is reasonably related to an important state interest, a question
the judge answered in the affirmative.88
B. League of Women Voters of Tennessee v. Hargett
The ruling in Miracle stands in stark contrast with a recent order
from a district court in Tennessee granting a request for a
preliminary injunction in a similar context. The order provides a
clear illustration of how judicial doctrine could evolve to provide
stronger First Amendment protection to organizations engaged in
political activity. In April 2019, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a
law regulating voter registration drives.89 The law, which has since been
repealed,90 required organizations and individuals planning such drives
to register with the state’s Coordinator of Elections and complete
government-provided training.91 The law further mandated that voter
registration forms be delivered within ten days of completion and, most
controversially, contained civil penalties for those who submitted
“‘incomplete’ voter registration applications,” even if unknowingly.92
Finally, the law required organizations to adhere to a disclaimer
provision for any “public communication regarding voter registration

completely unconnected to any indication that their signature was not valid, these
burdens are severe and the restriction must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.”).
84. Defendant Arizona Secretary of State’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 76, at 7–8, 16.
85. Order at 3, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (Dec. 16, 2019), ECF No. 36
(citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 414 (1988); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 182–83 (1999)).
86. Id. at 6.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 5–6, 12 (concluding that the Strikeout Law does not warrant strict scrutiny
because the law impacts activity only after protected speech has occurred and dismissing
Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to vote claims because the Arizona Supreme Court
had already determined that the law did not impede the initiative process).
89. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2-142 to -143, 2-19-132 (2019).
90. Press Release, Campaign Legal Center, Tennessee Removes Anti-Voter
Registration Provisions Following Federal Legal Challenge (Apr. 2, 2020), https://
campaignlegal.org/press-releases/tennessee-removes-anti-voter-registrationprovisions-following-federal-legal [https://perma.cc/ABZ3-JHSX].
91. § 2-2-142(a)(1)(C); Memorandum at 3, League of Women Voters of Tenn. v.
Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019), ECF No. 60.
92. Memorandum at 4-5, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019),
ECF No. 60.
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status.”93 The plaintiffs in the case—a group of organizations that engage
in voter registration drives—claimed that the law unconstitutionally
burdened their First Amendment rights of speech and association.94
They further argued that the law directly interfered with the
fundamental right to vote.95
As in Miracle, the parties disputed what the applicable standard of
review is in a case involving efforts by organizations to engage voters
in the political process.96 Notably, the district court judge agreed with
plaintiffs that “exacting scrutiny” was appropriate, given that the case
involved more than just a contest between individuals’ right to vote
and the state’s power to regulate the electoral process; the case
“implicate[s] more than those two sets of concerns.”97 In enjoining
the law in September 2019, the judge articulated a conception of
voting rights and political participation vastly different than what was
presented in Miracle. As stated, “[e]ncouraging others to register to
vote is ‘pure speech,’ and because that speech is political in nature, it
is a ‘core First Amendment activity.’”98
By contrast with the Miracle court’s recognition of a line between
“laws that regulate the communicative conduct of persons advocating
a particular message and laws that regulate the procedures by which
legislation is enacted,”99 the judge in Hargett voiced
skeptic[ism] that the First Amendment would countenance
“slic[ing] and dic[ing] the activities involved in the plaintiffs’ voter
registration drives” for constitutional purposes, both because doing
so would allow the government to burden the protected aspects of
the drive indirectly and because the “entire voter registration
activity” implicates the “freedom of the plaintiffs to associate with
others for the advancement of common beliefs [that] is protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”100

Likewise, whereas the Miracle court viewed subpoena-compliance as
a mere bureaucratic concern, divorced from the associational aspects
of the initiative process, the judge in Hargett concluded that “while
the civil penalties for incomplete applications are directed only at the
paperwork aspect of a drive, the threat of penalties is likely to have a
chilling effect on the entirety of the drive, including its communicative
aspects.”101 With regard to the registration and training requirements,
the court found the former unnecessary, particularly prior to
conducting a voter registration drive,102 and the latter an unwarranted
imposition of government speech.103 The court also enjoined the
93. Id. at 6–7 (describing how the disclaimer provision required voter
registration organizations to “display a disclaimer that such [public] communication
is not made in conjunction with or authorized by the secretary of state”).
94. Complaint at 40–43, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. May 9, 2019), ECF No. 1.
95. Id. at 50.
96. Memorandum at 18–19, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12,
2019), ECF No. 60 (“Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the requirements should be
subject to ‘exacting scrutiny,’ whereas the defendants argue that they should be
subject only to some lesser standard of review.”). After reviewing the variable
standards of review that courts have used in similar cases, the court later referred to
“this sometimes bewildering array of standards to choose from.” Id. at 22–23.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 19 (quoting League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Browning, 863 F. Supp.
2d 1155, 1158 (N.D. Fla. 2012)).
99. Supra note 85 and accompanying text.
100. Memorandum at 20, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019),
ECF No. 60 (citing Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 401, 404 (5th Cir.
2013) (Davis, J., dissenting)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 29.
103. Id. at 31 (“The state’s interest in avoiding errors might, therefore, justify a
simpler application form or a public education program, but there is substantial
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penalties for the submission of incomplete applications, noting that
“‘the collection and submission of applications is inextricably
intertwined with’ the expressive and advocatory aspects of the drive,
and it is impossible to burden one without, in effect, burdening the
other.”104 Finally, the court found the disclaimer requirement to
constitute unconstitutionally compelled speech.105
The conception of the “right to vote” expressed in Hargett is
substantially more capacious than that expressed in Miracle. The
voting ecosystem portrayed in Hargett is multi-dimensional and
functions at its best when state oversight, though necessary, is
judiciously calibrated. The judge’s sensitivity to this point is perhaps
best captured through her closing critique of the “cumulative
burden” that the Tennessee law’s provisions, when taken together,
imposed on organizations.106 Writing of the organizations’
“vulnerability,”107 she noted:
The Act would attack their limited resources from all sides. The
disclaimer and registration requirements produce compliance costs
for what might be an already cash-strapped organization. The
training and penalty provisions hamper the organization’s ability to
recruit qualified volunteers and registration workers. Then, when
the voter registration drive is done, the organization’s alreadydepleted resources may be drained by fines.108

Viewed in its entirety, the judge concluded that the law would likely
fail whether evaluated under strict scrutiny or the Anderson-Burdick
balancing test.109
In conclusion, both Miracle and Hargett share factual and legal
similarities insofar as they both involved organizations seeking to
increase political participation in ways that implicate the fundamental
right to vote,110 yet reached decidedly divergent outcomes regarding
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied, and the
bearing the First Amendment has on the resolution of such disputes.
III. THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM POLITICAL STAKES
This Part outlines the short- and long-term political significance of
whether a capacious or circumscribed conception of the right to vote in
this context prevails. A capacious view is one in which many organizational
efforts to increase political participation are deemed protected activities
reason to doubt that it can justify the unusually aggressive insertion of government
speech into private political association that the Act contemplates.”).
104. Id. at 34 (quoting League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Cobb, 447 F. Supp. 2d
1314, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2006)).
105. Id. at 35–37.
106. Id. at 41.
107. Id.
108. Id. Recall the similar reasoning expressed by Justice Stevens in Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), supra note 50, and accompanying text.
109. Memorandum at 42, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2019),
ECF No. 60.
110. One could argue that petitions for ballot initiatives are distinct from voter
registration drives, thereby justifying distinct judicial treatment. In Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414 (1988), and Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S.
182 (1999), the Supreme Court issued rulings on the constitutionality of state laws
regulating the initiative process. In both cases the Court invalidated Colorado
restrictions on petition circulators. However, the Court has not addressed the
constitutionality of laws regulating voter registration that are similar to what was
enacted in Tennessee. Notably, the judge in Hargett expressly rejected the suggested
distinction, finding both petition drives for ballot initiatives and voter registration
drives to be “central to shared political life.” Id. at 25–26; see also Derfner & Hebert,
supra note 51, at 488 (“The expressive nature of the vote is present whether the vote
is for a candidate in a primary or general election or for a ballot proposition, recall,
referendum or anything else called a vote.”).
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that warrant heightened judicial review. Such a view was evident in
Hargett.111 A circumscribed view affords deference, under a lesser form
of judicial review, to state regulations that increase administrative
burdens and impose compliance costs on organizations attempting to
engage the citizenry.112 Such a view was evident in Miracle.113
In the short term, obviously, the organizations operating in Arizona
and Tennessee face very different environments. In Arizona,
subpoena challenges could prove fatal to the signature-gathering
efforts of initiative petition circulators. At the time of this writing, the
district court judge hearing Miracle has recently denied a motion for
reconsideration.114 An appeal to the Ninth Circuit may follow.
Meanwhile, petition circulators are gathering signatures to place an
initiative on the 2020 ballot that would ban “dark money” in Arizona
elections.115 A separate initiative effort would, among other things,
require automatic voter registration and limit political spending.116 The
resolution of Miracle will directly impact the likelihood of whether these
initiatives are put to the voters. In Tennessee, given the legislature’s
repeal of the voter registration law, voter registration organizations
are now free to collect and submit voter registration forms without
the fear of civil penalties being levied on them for unwittingly
submitting incomplete forms.
More broadly, courts’ decisions about whether to adopt a capacious
or circumscribed conception of the right to vote in this context will
likely determine the legality of dozens of similar laws being
challenged around the country. For example, the Eastern District of
Michigan is hearing challenges to two Michigan laws: one that makes
it a misdemeanor to “hire a motor vehicle”117 to take voters to polling
stations unless they are “physically unable to walk,” and another that
makes it a crime to help voters submit absentee ballots.118 Though the
facts differ from those of Miracle and Hargett, the essential legal
question is the same: are organizations that seek to engage the
citizenry for the purpose of increasing political participation able to
operate free of only the most necessary impediments?
Greater political participation is normatively desirable independent
of any electoral consequences. However, the levels of voter turnout
and citizen participation—i.e., the individuals both inspired to and
permitted to participate—in Election 2020 may be the dispositive

111. Memorandum at 24, 26–27, Hargett, No. 3:19-cv-00385 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12,
2019), ECF No. 60.
112. The economist Richard Thaler has aptly described such administrative
burdens as “sludge.” Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, SCI. (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/361/6401/431.full
[https://perma.cc/D3X2-LP6T].
113. Order at 14, Miracle v. Hobbs, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. Dec. 16,
2019), ECF No. 36.
114. Order at 12, Miracle, No. 2:19-cv-04694-SRB (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2020), ECF No. 58.
115. Jeremy Duda, Effort to End ‘Dark Money’ in AZ Campaigns Hires Paid Circulators,
ARIZ. MIRROR (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.azmirror.com/blog/effort-to-end-darkmoney-in-az-campaigns-hires-paid-circulators [https://perma.cc/7WVX-WKAK]. On
“dark money,” see Joshua S. Sellers, Contributions, Bribes, and the Convergence of Political
and Criminal Corruption, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 676–83 (2018).
116. Steven Hsieh, Ballot Initiative Would Limit Big Campaign Donors, Transform Elections
in Arizona, PHX. NEW TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019, 2:24 PM), https://www.phoenix
newtimes.com/news/ballot-initiative-would-make-it-easier-to-vote-in-arizona-11379200
[https://perma.cc/557X-56GE]. In full disclosure, I am on the Board of the Arizona
Advocacy Network and Foundation, the sponsoring organization of this initiative.
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.931(1)(f) (2020).
118. § 168.759(4), (5), (8); Complaint at 2–3, Priorities USA v. Nessel, No. 2:19-cv13341 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2019).
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factors in many electoral outcomes.119 Particularly with regard to
voter registration, the ability of nonpolitical party organizations to
mount effective voter registration drives is of great consequence. In
an insightful recent article, Bertrall Ross and Douglas Spencer detail
how political parties and campaign organizations, largely for strategic
reasons, systematically fail to engage with certain members of the
citizenry.120 The authors argue that because voter mobilization efforts
come at a cost, campaigns must be strategic about whom they
contact. Given resource limitations, the most sensible strategy is to
contact those most likely to participate in an election and support the
campaign.121 As a result, nonvoters, many of whom have lower
socioeconomic statuses, are rarely mobilized.122 Consequently, the work
done by voter registration organizations over the coming months in
communicating with and registering nonvoters is essential to increase
voter participation rates this fall and beyond. As explicated above, the
viability of these organizations’ operations depends on how much
constitutional protection their activities receive.
In the long term, a larger, philosophical question must be addressed:
how much do we value equality of political participation?123 As repeated
above, a capacious conception of the right to vote is inherently dubious
of government efforts to curb political participation and apprehends
the links between organizational outreach and engagement. Under
this conception, courts would closely scrutinize laws that allegedly
undermine participatory efforts.124 Adoption of such a conception
abets a more grandiose, inclusive notion of civic participation that
should be encouraged.
A long-term outlook also reveals that a capacious conception of the
right to vote holds the promise of reducing partisan abuse. Though
not emphasized in this Essay, many of the recent laws impacting
organizations are partisan power plays, designed to dampen the
political participation of groups believed to hold sympathies for
political opponents. A circumscribed conception of the right to vote
makes it more difficult to respond to this fact. If courts, however,
comprehensively probe the relationship between electoral

119. See Nate Cohn, Huge Turnout Is Expected in 2020. So Which Party Would Benefit?,
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/upshot/2020election-turnout-analysis.html; William A. Galston, What Does High Voter Turnout Tell
Us About the 2020 Elections?, BROOKINGS (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.brookings.
edu/blog/fixgov/2019/11/20/what-does-high-voter-turnout-tell-us-about-the-2020elections [https://perma.cc/UB3P-2JWS].
120. Bertrall L. Ross II & Douglas M. Spencer, Passive Voter Suppression: Campaign
Mobilization and the Effective Disfranchisement of the Poor, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 633, 680 (2019)
(“There is one consistent feature that cuts across virtually all contemporary campaign
mobilization strategies: the avoidance of unregistered, infrequent, and nonvoters.”).
121. Id. at 678–80.
122. Id. at 680–87.
123. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality,
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2412 (2003) (arguing “that the decision
whether to cabin official discretion, or, alternatively, to adopt a more deferential test
in a given context reflects a judgment, usually a silent one, about the relative value of
discretion and equality”).
124. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New Pressures
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 644 (2008)
(“Scrutiny levels should be tied to the aggregate consequences of voting
requirements for the rate and demographics of voter participation.”); Tokaji, supra
note 123, at 2523 (“Where official discretion threatens to deny equality of political
participation, courts should apply heightened front-end scrutiny comparable to that
which has traditionally been applied in First Amendment equality cases.”); see also
Manheim & Porter, supra note 15, at 243 (“There is something particularly
constitutionally offensive, in our view, about a government intending to undermine a
right whose very existence depends on that government’s good graces.”).

1632

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1617

regulations, expressive association, and political participation,
doctrinal space exists to consider the central role of partisanship in
many of these contests.125
A final long-term concern, one focused more on law than on
politics per se, is the achievement of doctrinal harmonization.
Scholars have long argued that voting is a type of speech and should
be recognized as such under the First Amendment.126 Federal courts’
difficulties reconciling Anderson-Burdick’s balancing test with First
Amendment jurisprudence is intellectually intriguing, yet leaves
voters, organizations, and litigants in an untenable state of
uncertainty. A unifying theory of political participation—one that
includes organizations—would therefore be of enormous benefit.127
CONCLUSION
Looking ahead, the judiciary’s immensely important role in defining
the nature of democratic engagement is apparent. Though this is by
now a familiar role, political circumstances are always changing such
that even basic legal disputes, even the most pedestrian, emerge in new
forms. In some states, there seems to be an endless supply of creativity
put towards shrinking the electorate.128 The recurrent nature of these
disputes, especially as we approach Election 2020, creates the possibility
of constructing a conception of the right to vote that encompasses
clearly established First Amendment protections for organizations. In
one sense this development would seem paradoxical, with more
intensive methods of election administration ultimately expanding
voting and expressive association rights. Yet, perhaps this possibility is
not paradoxical at all. Perhaps the better understanding of such a
development, one the history of voting rights reveals, is that the
greatest opportunities for broadening the electorate and increasing
political engagement—both of which are goals to which we should
aspire—arise when opposition is greatest.

125. Tokaji, supra note 11, at 787 (“Litigants and courts have not focused directly
on partisan disparate impact. Recognition of the associational rights implicated by
voting cases would allow courts to focus on the real harm, the dominant political
party disadvantaging supporters of its main rival.”); id. at 791 (“The cost of losing the
voting-association connection is to obscure the central question whether the
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